羅伯特·福格爾：為什么中國有可能實(shí)現(xiàn)其增長目標(biāo)？

　　羅伯特·福格爾（Robert W.Fogel ）**

　　美國國民經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局研究員，1993年諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主

　　原載《比較》第25輯，吳敬璉主編，中信出版社，2006

　　2002年，中國共產(chǎn)黨宣布了到2020年使人均收入實(shí)現(xiàn)翻兩番的目標(biāo)。從2000年開始，要實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)，中國的人均收入的年均增長率必須達(dá)到7.2%，而GDP 的年均增長率需要達(dá)到8%左右（M.Wang ，2005）。中國有可能實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)嗎？這一問題已經(jīng)在亞洲、歐洲和美洲引起了廣泛討論，對(duì)此既有人持樂觀態(tài)度，也有人表示悲觀。

　　在本文中，我將列出一些我之所以對(duì)此持樂觀態(tài)度的原因。事實(shí)上，我認(rèn)為，中國的GDP至少在未來30年中將很可能保持8%或更高的年均增長率。要實(shí)現(xiàn)這一增長目標(biāo)，中國必須克服一些經(jīng)濟(jì)問題、結(jié)構(gòu)問題以及政治問題。在對(duì)這些實(shí)質(zhì)性問題進(jìn)行探討之前，我們先來看一些數(shù)據(jù)，以便為下文的分析奠定基礎(chǔ)。

　　二戰(zhàn)以來，亞洲的幾個(gè)窮國在相對(duì)長的時(shí)間里取得了異常快速的增長率。在1950年到1970年的20年間，日本的人均收入的年均增長率達(dá)到了8.4%，人均收入增長了6倍以上，這一成果比中國政府目前制定的目標(biāo)還要高出50%.而在1960年至1980年的20年里，新加坡的人均收入的年均增長率為7.2%，同期，中國臺(tái)灣也達(dá)到了7.2%的水平。中國在1980年至2002年的22年間的實(shí)際年均增長率（8.2%）也比目前定下的目標(biāo)要高（Fogel ，2004b ）。因此，中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層定下的目標(biāo)完全符合東亞國家經(jīng)濟(jì)快速增長的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。

　　然而，那些懷疑中國新的增長目標(biāo)能否實(shí)現(xiàn)的人并非不了解亞洲地區(qū)這些國家已有的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，他們只是擔(dān)心，中國能否在從現(xiàn)在到2020年的近20年間重現(xiàn)那樣的增長奇跡。他們之所以有這種擔(dān)憂，是因?yàn)樗麄冋J(rèn)為那些尚未解決的、或者不斷涌現(xiàn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)問題、政治問題以及國際問題會(huì)大大削弱中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率。其中的一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)問題就是存在背負(fù)大量不良貸款的不穩(wěn)定的銀行體系。人們還認(rèn)為，大批低效和虧損的國有企業(yè)也是影響未來中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的因素之一。此外，在發(fā)展較快的沿海省份和發(fā)展較慢的內(nèi)陸省份之間、城鄉(xiāng)之間以及高技能勞動(dòng)者和體力勞動(dòng)者之間的收入差距也在不斷增長（參見Heckman ，2005）。不僅如此，中國在基礎(chǔ)建設(shè)方面也面臨著“瓶頸”，其中包括能源和電力的供給壓力、環(huán)境污染的惡化等問題。盡管人們已不再懷疑中國是否有能力養(yǎng)活13億人口，但越來越擔(dān)心這個(gè)國家的水資源供給是否充足。以上問題并沒有涵蓋所有可能阻礙中國經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)高速增長的因素，卻反映了一些主要的憂慮[1].

　　雖然我也認(rèn)識(shí)到了上述問題的重要性，但本文不會(huì)對(duì)這些問題做過多探討。我認(rèn)為這些都是需要在經(jīng)濟(jì)增長過程中加以解決的問題，并且，基于我將在本文下半部分指出的一些原因，我也深信它們會(huì)得到解決。顯然，上述問題已經(jīng)被中國的政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人及其經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問們提上了議事日程，事實(shí)上，他們一直在強(qiáng)調(diào)必須消除中國社會(huì)發(fā)展和經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的不平衡問題。

　　在下文中，我會(huì)首先對(duì)一些可能阻礙中國經(jīng)濟(jì)在未來十年保持快速增長的根本因素進(jìn)行探討，也就是說，即使我們前面提到的那些問題都能成功解決，這些制約因素也會(huì)阻礙中國可能的長期增長。

　　為了更好地理解這些制約性的因素，我們最好先對(duì)中國在1978年至2002年間的人均收入的增長來源做一個(gè)分解。對(duì)此，可參見圖1中的等式（1）和等式（2）。等式（1）是一個(gè)定義式，表示人均收入水平等于工人的人均產(chǎn)出乘以勞動(dòng)力參與率。在等式（1）中，經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出被分解為三個(gè)部門：農(nóng)業(yè)、工業(yè)和服務(wù)業(yè)。每個(gè)部門的勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率用該部門的勞動(dòng)力份額加權(quán)。等式（2）是對(duì)等式（1）變形后得到的增長率，它表明人均收入的增長率來自勞動(dòng)力在各個(gè)部門的份額的變化、每個(gè)部門的勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率的變化、以及總體的勞動(dòng)力參與率的變化，各部門的權(quán)重采用的是該部門的收入在整體經(jīng)濟(jì)中所占的份額。

　　表1顯示，在1978年至2002年間，中國的人均收入69%的增長都來源于三大部門內(nèi)部勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率的提高[2].其中，工業(yè)部門雖然存在很多低效的國有企業(yè)且資本配置效率較低，但其勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率的增長卻最為迅速。正如林毅夫等人（Lin 和Tsai，2004，第355～356頁）

　　指出的那樣，中國逐漸從中央計(jì)劃體制向市場經(jīng)濟(jì)過渡的政策似乎比那些激進(jìn)的方式更有效。

　　通過漸進(jìn)的改革，市場的范圍成功擴(kuò)展了，甚至國有企業(yè)的買賣也根據(jù)市場價(jià)格進(jìn)行，而與計(jì)劃價(jià)格掛鉤。

　　表1：1978-2002年增長分解中所用的變量及加權(quán)數(shù)的值

　　變量或加權(quán)數(shù)1978-2000年的年均變化率

　　表1還表明，盡管工業(yè)部門的勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率提高最為迅速，但農(nóng)業(yè)部門的勞動(dòng)力生產(chǎn)率的進(jìn)步也幾乎不相上下（工業(yè)部門為6.2%，農(nóng)業(yè)部門為5.7%）。此外，農(nóng)業(yè)部門生產(chǎn)率的迅速提高已經(jīng)持續(xù)了20多年。表2則顯示，盡管中國的農(nóng)業(yè)勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率在這20多年的增長率并非前所未有，但與亞洲和歐洲其他國家相比卻依然出類拔萃。事實(shí)上，只有韓國的農(nóng)業(yè)勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率在1980年至1997年間的增長率超過了中國，但當(dāng)時(shí)，韓國的大部分農(nóng)業(yè)勞動(dòng)力都已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)移到了工業(yè)和服務(wù)業(yè)部門。就中國而言，近一半的勞動(dòng)力依舊保留在農(nóng)業(yè)部門，因此，勞動(dòng)力可以繼續(xù)向工業(yè)和服務(wù)也大規(guī)模轉(zhuǎn)移，那么與1980年到2000年的20年相比，農(nóng)業(yè)勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率在未來20年可能有更大的提高潛力。

　　表2：部分國家農(nóng)業(yè)勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率的年均增長率（%）

　　資料來源：（a ）2000/2001年世界發(fā)展報(bào)告，表8.

　　（b ）世界銀行，世界發(fā)展指數(shù)，http://publications.worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI

　�。╟ ）Jorgenson 和Stiroh，2000，表2.

　　（d ）亞洲開發(fā)銀行，2004.

　　由于在中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率中有30%可能繼續(xù)來源于勞動(dòng)力的部門轉(zhuǎn)移以及勞動(dòng)參與率的小幅增長（Johnson 2000），因此，各行業(yè)內(nèi)的平均勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率每年只需要提高5%，即可實(shí)現(xiàn)預(yù)定的人均收入增長目標(biāo)。若干因素顯示，這種增長率的實(shí)現(xiàn)不是沒有可能的。盡管近幾十年來中國已經(jīng)取得了巨大的進(jìn)步，但在農(nóng)業(yè)、工業(yè)和服務(wù)業(yè)這三個(gè)部門中，平均的技術(shù)水平還是大大低于國際領(lǐng)先者。因此，先進(jìn)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的推廣會(huì)促進(jìn)各部門的增長。其次，前沿技術(shù)的創(chuàng)新速度非�？欤�尤其是在工業(yè)和服務(wù)業(yè)領(lǐng)域，當(dāng)然農(nóng)業(yè)領(lǐng)域也是如此。第三，對(duì)資本尤其是人力資本的投資也會(huì)在接下來的幾十年中促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速增長。最后，盡管目前人們都認(rèn)為由于地方政府上報(bào)的增長率存在夸大現(xiàn)象，中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率有可能被高估了，但總體而言，由于沒有考慮到經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出的質(zhì)量的進(jìn)步，以及小企業(yè)低報(bào)收入的情況，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的實(shí)際增長率尤其是服務(wù)業(yè)的增長率也很有可能被低估。現(xiàn)在，我想對(duì)上述的最后兩個(gè)因素做一個(gè)簡要地說明，并對(duì)這兩個(gè)因素在未來二三十年中可能對(duì)增長率造成的影響進(jìn)行估計(jì)。

　　要素升級(jí)的作用

　　表3顯示了中國在1980年、1990年、1997年以及2000年的小學(xué)、中學(xué)以及大學(xué)的入學(xué)率，并與7個(gè)亞洲國家、4個(gè)西歐國家以及美國進(jìn)行了比較。中國的小學(xué)入學(xué)率超過其他所有國家，中學(xué)入學(xué)率與其他新興工業(yè)化國家不相上下，但落后于韓國、日本、西歐以及美國。不過，在1990年至1997年間，這一差距已經(jīng)迅速需縮小。在這短短的幾年中，中國的中學(xué)入學(xué)率增長了40%.中國與發(fā)達(dá)國家在大學(xué)入學(xué)率方面差距最大，相當(dāng)于韓國、日本、西歐和美國的入學(xué)率的15%~27%.然而，這一差距同樣也在迅速縮小。1990年至2004年，中國的大學(xué)入學(xué)率提高了6倍（中國統(tǒng)計(jì)年鑒，2005）。

　　表3：各國的毛入學(xué)率

　　資料來源：美國教育部、國家教育統(tǒng)計(jì)中心，2004，表394.

　　http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04/tables/xls/tabn394.xls

　　備注：毛入學(xué)率等于所有年齡段在校學(xué)生的總?cè)藬?shù)除以特定年齡段的學(xué)齡人口數(shù)所得的值。由于相關(guān)年齡段以外的學(xué)生也包含在內(nèi)，因此該比率的值有可能會(huì)超過100.

　　通過圖2中的等式，我們可以將由教育導(dǎo)致的勞動(dòng)力質(zhì)量的提高對(duì)人均收入增長率的影響進(jìn)行定量處理。等式（3）是一個(gè)反映要素升級(jí)影響的生產(chǎn)函數(shù)，其中YL、YK分別代表勞動(dòng)和資本的升級(jí)指數(shù)（我的討論將僅限于勞動(dòng)）。等式（4）是等式（3）的變形，因變量是勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率，中括號(hào)里的項(xiàng)包括各種要素的升級(jí)指數(shù)與全要素生產(chǎn)率的增長指數(shù)。等式（5）是從等式（4）中得到的增長率表達(dá)式，它意味著如果其他所有變量都為常數(shù)，那么勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率的增長率應(yīng)該等于勞動(dòng)升級(jí)的增長率乘以勞動(dòng)在收入中所占的比重。

　　圖2：勞動(dòng)升級(jí)型的生產(chǎn)函數(shù)

　　表4列出了實(shí)現(xiàn)等式（5）的增長率所需要的一些條件。表的上半部分列出了具有小學(xué)、高中以及大學(xué)文憑的勞動(dòng)力的相對(duì)生產(chǎn)率指數(shù)。該指數(shù)的計(jì)算基礎(chǔ)是美國具有不同教育水平的男性的收入。它表明，具有大學(xué)和高中文化程度的員工的勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率分別是受教育年限少于9年的工人的3.1倍和1.8倍[3].表的下半部分顯示了入學(xué)率的增加對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的貢獻(xiàn)。如果在未來20年，初中入學(xué)率達(dá)到了100%，那么勞動(dòng)力升級(jí)的年均增長率會(huì)達(dá)到1.8%.將這個(gè)數(shù)字乘以勞動(dòng)在收入中所占的份額，就意味著勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率的增長率會(huì)提高約1.1個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。

　　表4：中學(xué)和高等教育導(dǎo)致的勞動(dòng)升級(jí)對(duì)人均收入增長率的可能影響

　　α值來源于Young （2000），指數(shù)值是根據(jù)美國的以教育程度衡量的中期收入計(jì)算出來的（美國教育部、國家教育統(tǒng)計(jì)中心，2001，表383，http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d01/dt383.asp

　　如果大學(xué)入學(xué)率在未來20年能從6%增加至25%，也就是說，如果未來20年中國的高等教育能達(dá)到1980年時(shí)西歐國家的水平，那么勞動(dòng)升級(jí)就會(huì)以年均7.4%的速度增長。這一勞動(dòng)升級(jí)水平將使勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率增長4.4個(gè)百分點(diǎn)，僅這一個(gè)因素就能對(duì)2002年的既定目標(biāo)做出60%的貢獻(xiàn)。如果高等院校有更大規(guī)模的擴(kuò)招計(jì)劃，使大學(xué)入學(xué)率在未來20年內(nèi)達(dá)到50%，那么勞動(dòng)升級(jí)的年均增長率就會(huì)達(dá)到11.2%.光是人力資本投資這個(gè)因素就能對(duì)整體經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率作出6.7個(gè)百分點(diǎn)的貢獻(xiàn)。

　　高等教育的這些目標(biāo)并不是無法實(shí)現(xiàn)的。我們應(yīng)該記住，就在不遠(yuǎn)的1980年，西歐國家高等院校的入學(xué)率還只有25%，只有美國超過了50%.但就在20世紀(jì)末的最后20年，西歐國家的入學(xué)率都達(dá)到了50%.比如英國，其入學(xué)率從19%增加到了52%，其中2/3的增長都發(fā)生在1990年到1997年間。

　　中國政府也意識(shí)到了人力資本投資作為經(jīng)濟(jì)增長引擎的重要性。早在1998年，國家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人就發(fā)出了高等院校進(jìn)行大規(guī)模擴(kuò)招的號(hào)召。這一號(hào)召很快得到了響應(yīng)：在接下來的4年中，高等院校的招生人數(shù)增加了165%（從340萬增加到了900萬），而海外留學(xué)人員的數(shù)量也增加了152%（中國統(tǒng)計(jì)年鑒，2003）。目前估計(jì)，到2010年，至少20%的高中畢業(yè)生會(huì)繼續(xù)進(jìn)入高等院校學(xué)習(xí)，而到2050的長期目標(biāo)是達(dá)到50%.從2000年到2004年間，大學(xué)入學(xué)率增長了約50%（從12.5%增加到了19.0%），因此，表4中的計(jì)算結(jié)果很可能還過于保守了（中國統(tǒng)計(jì)年鑒，2005）。目前，中國高等院校的學(xué)生約有2000萬，這一數(shù)目比現(xiàn)階段美國高等院校的學(xué)生人數(shù)要多60%（Newcomb ，2005；
美國統(tǒng)計(jì)概要，2005）。據(jù)估計(jì)，2005年至2006年間，中國大學(xué)畢業(yè)生會(huì)達(dá)到330萬，印度為310萬，而美國僅為130萬（Colvin，2005）。

　　不過，在科技教育的前沿領(lǐng)域，美國仍然遙遙領(lǐng)先。

　　有關(guān)GDP 測算的誤差

　　(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　到目前為止，我主要集中從要素升級(jí)的視角來論述為什么中國可能實(shí)現(xiàn)其增長目標(biāo)�，F(xiàn)在我想就等式（5）中產(chǎn)出部分的測算問題進(jìn)行一些探討。國民收入賬戶中出現(xiàn)測算誤差的問題正日益變得嚴(yán)重。很明顯，美國官方估計(jì)的GDP 數(shù)據(jù)嚴(yán)重低估了美國經(jīng)濟(jì)的真實(shí)增長水平，因?yàn)樗麄儧]有將美國的產(chǎn)出質(zhì)量的提高，尤其是像教育和衛(wèi)生等服務(wù)業(yè)的質(zhì)量提高計(jì)算在內(nèi)。比如，現(xiàn)在的中學(xué)生接受的科學(xué)和技術(shù)教育比一代人以前的研究生學(xué)到的還多，與兩代人之前相比就更是如此了。

　　在這方面，醫(yī)療衛(wèi)生行業(yè)的進(jìn)步還要突出。一個(gè)半世紀(jì)以前，40歲左右的就往往深受慢性病的困擾，情況要比現(xiàn)在70歲左右的人還嚴(yán)重。現(xiàn)在，不僅疾病發(fā)作的平均年齡延后了10年左右，而且一旦出現(xiàn)疾病，我們也可以采取各種有效的治療措施。過去，1/4的男性會(huì)遭受疝氣的長期折磨，但在今天的美國，這種疾病只需要病人住院23小時(shí)，通過一個(gè)外科手術(shù)即可解決。醫(yī)療措施能夠有效地發(fā)揮作用的領(lǐng)域還包括泌尿生殖系統(tǒng)疾病的治療、高血壓的控制、中風(fēng)發(fā)生幾率的減少、膝關(guān)節(jié)和髖關(guān)節(jié)復(fù)位、白內(nèi)障治療以及能降低骨質(zhì)疏松癥和心臟病發(fā)病幾率的治療等（Fogel ，2004a ）。

　　但上述醫(yī)療衛(wèi)生方面的巨大進(jìn)步絕大多數(shù)都被GDP 賬戶忽略了，原因在于，這些部門的價(jià)值是以投入而不是產(chǎn)出來衡量的。與半個(gè)世紀(jì)之前相比，今天一個(gè)醫(yī)生工作一個(gè)小時(shí)的費(fèi)用并沒有什么不同，而那時(shí)，抗生素和現(xiàn)代手術(shù)技術(shù)還未出現(xiàn)。最近，有人做了一個(gè)估計(jì)，如果能采取一種更科學(xué)的估算方法，那么醫(yī)療衛(wèi)生領(lǐng)域的進(jìn)步所產(chǎn)生的價(jià)值將至少是該行業(yè)的投入成本的2倍。然而，這樣的計(jì)算方法并沒有被GDP 賬戶所采用（Cutler和McClellan ，2001；
Murphy和Topel ，2003；
Nordhaus，2003）。就美國而言，根據(jù)我自己的粗略估計(jì)，如果將諸如“閑暇時(shí)間的增加”、“醫(yī)療衛(wèi)生質(zhì)量的提高”以及“教育質(zhì)量的提高”這類因素考慮在內(nèi)，那么在過去一個(gè)世紀(jì)里，美國的人均收入的年均增長率將會(huì)翻一番（從年均2.0%增長至3.6%）。

　　這些統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)字對(duì)于我們理解一般美國人的生活水平的變化會(huì)帶來什么啟示呢？如果我們采用傳統(tǒng)的增長測算方法，那么美國人在2000年的實(shí)際收入就是1900年的8倍。但如果我們采取的是調(diào)整后的方法，那么美國人在2000年的實(shí)際收入就是1900年的35倍。換句話說，如今的美國人享受的80%的商品和服務(wù)都被排除在經(jīng)濟(jì)測量之外了（Fogel ，2000和2004）。

　　如果在衡量中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長時(shí)也不能將這種產(chǎn)出質(zhì)量的進(jìn)步考慮在內(nèi)，又會(huì)產(chǎn)生什么影響呢？在中國，人們的預(yù)期壽命的大幅度延長主要發(fā)生在改革開放以前。在1950年到1980年之間，新生兒的預(yù)期壽命從40.8歲增加到了67.8歲。到2000年，人們的預(yù)期壽命已經(jīng)達(dá)到71.4歲，即在經(jīng)濟(jì)改革逐漸加速的時(shí)期，預(yù)期壽命年均增加約0.18歲（Keyfitz 和Flieger ，1990；
中國統(tǒng)計(jì)年鑒，2003）。有關(guān)窮國和富國的人均壽命的價(jià)值的研究表明，中國人的壽命每增加一歲，所帶來的價(jià)值相當(dāng)于人均年收入的3.5倍（參見Murphy和Topel ，2002；
Visvusi和Aldy，2003）。因此，如果將壽命延長這種未被衡量的進(jìn)步考慮在內(nèi)，那么中國在1980年至2000年間的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率還應(yīng)該提高60%.如果中國GDP 在2000年至2040年間的實(shí)際增長率為13%而不是8%的話，那么整個(gè)中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的規(guī)模到2040年將是現(xiàn)在所測算的經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模的6倍。

　　當(dāng)然，考慮到美國和中國在產(chǎn)出測算中都沒有考慮經(jīng)濟(jì)質(zhì)量的改進(jìn)，這兩個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的相對(duì)排名也不會(huì)有太顯著的變化。

　　政治不穩(wěn)定是否會(huì)阻礙經(jīng)濟(jì)增長

　　到目前為止，我只是單純地考慮了經(jīng)濟(jì)因素。有些分析人士認(rèn)為，政治不穩(wěn)定將嚴(yán)重阻礙中國維持高經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率。這樣的觀點(diǎn)描繪了好幾種糟糕的可能性。有些人首先指出，由于劇烈的周期性經(jīng)濟(jì)波動(dòng)所引起的蕭敗會(huì)引發(fā)失業(yè)，打破目前并不牢固的社會(huì)穩(wěn)定局面。另一些人則認(rèn)為金融問題和低效率的國有企業(yè)已經(jīng)使中國的社會(huì)越來越動(dòng)蕩。他們認(rèn)為，這些問題不僅會(huì)導(dǎo)致城市失業(yè)增加，而且也使得工資、養(yǎng)老金、醫(yī)療以及住房補(bǔ)貼不能兌現(xiàn)（Bremmer，2005；
Chaohua ，2005）。此外，還有人警告說，受巨額不良貸款困擾的中國銀行體系即將崩潰，而這一崩潰會(huì)影響微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)的穩(wěn)定（Garnaut 和Song，2004）。

　　其他一些威脅到社會(huì)穩(wěn)定的因素還包括：普遍存在的腐��；
內(nèi)部權(quán)力斗爭；
房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)、國際貿(mào)易以及鋼鐵（還有其他一些產(chǎn)品）行業(yè)的泡沫；
城鄉(xiāng)之間、沿海和內(nèi)陸之間、高級(jí)知識(shí)分子和教育程度較低的大眾之間、漢族和少數(shù)民族之間的發(fā)展不平衡問題。還有一個(gè)較為新穎的觀點(diǎn)指出，由于15歲至34歲之間的中國人的男女性別比急劇不平衡，這會(huì)引發(fā)高犯罪率和暴力行為，導(dǎo)致不穩(wěn)定的婚姻關(guān)系。有些人還指出，國際局勢的緊張，尤其是臺(tái)灣問題，會(huì)使領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人不再注意力放在經(jīng)濟(jì)目標(biāo)上（Pei ，2005；
Bradsher，2004；
Dunphy，2004，Hu，2000；
Lim ，2004；
Business Asia ，2002；
McGregor，2004；
Wilson，2004；
EIU ViewsWire，2004）。

　　在預(yù)測未來的時(shí)候，可能出現(xiàn)的情況幾乎是沒有窮盡的。但問題的關(guān)鍵不是有可能發(fā)生什么，而是更容易發(fā)生什么。重要的是，很多人提出的問題事實(shí)上都是中國社會(huì)長期存在的，比如低效率的國有企業(yè)問題等。盡管這些國有企業(yè)或許會(huì)成為經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的包袱，但中國仍然在過去25年中取得了年均8%以上的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長速度。那種認(rèn)為這些低效企業(yè)會(huì)在一夜間破產(chǎn)的觀點(diǎn)是沒有說服力的。中國政府已經(jīng)出臺(tái)了政策，逐漸關(guān)閉了某些虧損企業(yè)，或者在保證盈利的基礎(chǔ)上對(duì)這些企業(yè)進(jìn)行了重組，以確保不會(huì)導(dǎo)致失業(yè)率的急劇上升。即便政府出于某些經(jīng)濟(jì)或政治因素的考慮需要對(duì)這些低效企業(yè)提供補(bǔ)貼，它也有足夠的資金支持，而且這種補(bǔ)貼負(fù)擔(dān)會(huì)逐漸消失，因?yàn)殡S著經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速增長，經(jīng)營狀況欠佳的國有企業(yè)提供的工業(yè)產(chǎn)出的比例會(huì)逐漸降低，財(cái)政補(bǔ)貼負(fù)擔(dān)也會(huì)快速消失。

　　這些分析也同樣適用于國有銀行問題。盡管中國國有銀行的不良貸款比例已經(jīng)達(dá)到了35%，但中國并沒有處于銀行體系即將崩潰的邊緣。政府完全有能力消除這些負(fù)擔(dān)。從根本上講，國有銀行之所以受壞賬所累，主要是因?yàn)楫?dāng)初政府要求這些銀行向虧損的國有企業(yè)提供融資。

　　但是，大量流入的外商直接投資減輕了這種由融資政策引發(fā)的無效率和扭曲。中國政府一直鼓勵(lì)引入外資，而這些外資在流入的同時(shí)也向中國轉(zhuǎn)移了大量的先進(jìn)技術(shù)。外商直接投資主要流向大企業(yè)，使得中國的各大銀行有能力向那些小規(guī)模企業(yè)提供所需的資本（林毅夫、蔡昉和李周，2003；
樊綱，2005）。此外，隨著政府能夠更有效地利用貨幣體系來調(diào)控商業(yè)周期，以及資本市場改革的不斷深化，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)生活中的扭曲現(xiàn)象會(huì)得到改善。舉例來說，不久前中國政府對(duì)四大國有銀行中的兩家進(jìn)行了重組，將這兩家銀行的資本金充足率提高到了國際水平。也許更重要的是，中國的政府債務(wù)很低，還不到GDP 的1/5，這就使政府有余地實(shí)行其所需要的穩(wěn)定政策，包括對(duì)銀行系統(tǒng)的快速重組等，而不是繼續(xù)推行漸進(jìn)的改革方案（林毅夫、蔡昉和李周，2003；
樊綱，2005）。

　　盡管領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層對(duì)實(shí)行什么樣的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策或許會(huì)存在分歧，但他們的基本立場卻是一致的，那就是中國應(yīng)該繼續(xù)推進(jìn)向市場經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型的改革。此外，關(guān)于加大地方政府的經(jīng)濟(jì)決策權(quán)以推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長這一點(diǎn)，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層也沒有異議。正如很多分析人士指出的那樣，中國政府團(tuán)結(jié)在一個(gè)叫做“市場聯(lián)邦主義”的政策周圍。這種具有中國特色的聯(lián)邦制會(huì)限制中央政府對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)決策的過多控制，促進(jìn)地方政府之間的有效競爭，抑制尋租行為，并刺激創(chuàng)新型的地方企業(yè)的發(fā)展。這種聯(lián)邦制在稅收體系方面也體現(xiàn)得較為明顯，被稱為“財(cái)政聯(lián)邦主義”，它可以避免稅收對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的抑制。在1994年的稅收改革中，中央政府的權(quán)限限制在了增值稅和中央下屬的企業(yè)的所得稅方面。此外，還建立了歸屬地方政府的地稅局。盡管在財(cái)政體系構(gòu)建的過程中還有很多工作要做，尤其是要縮小地方發(fā)展的不平衡，但這些問題都已經(jīng)提上了國家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的改革日程。中央領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人同樣明白地方自治權(quán)過多的危害和副作用——可能導(dǎo)致尋租、道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及其他形式的腐敗，他們知道必須對(duì)地方政府的行為進(jìn)行監(jiān)管，同時(shí)在必要時(shí)對(duì)腐敗給予處罰。要成功實(shí)現(xiàn)自治權(quán)的下放需要一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的中央政府，它既能夠?qū)⒅醒肱c地方的發(fā)展目標(biāo)統(tǒng)一起來，又能很好地約束地方政府那些危害改革進(jìn)程的腐敗行為，同時(shí)還能對(duì)推動(dòng)改革進(jìn)程的地方政府給予獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)（林毅夫、蔡昉和李周，2003；
Bahl和Martrinez-Vazquez，2003；
Blanchard 和Shleifer，2000；
Montinola 、錢穎一和Weingast，1996；
Krug、Zhu和Hendrischke ，2003）。

　　有些分析人士還提出，除非中國引入多黨競爭機(jī)制，否則中央和各省之間的關(guān)系就會(huì)非常緊張，從而會(huì)危害中國的政治穩(wěn)定并阻礙經(jīng)濟(jì)的高速增長。還有人認(rèn)為，難以解決的發(fā)展不平衡問題也使基層集聚怨憤，甚至有可能使局勢失控（Goldstone ，1995；
Ohman ，1995；
Esarey，2002）。分析人士強(qiáng)調(diào)的其他事情還包括，環(huán)境的不斷惡化、公共醫(yī)療改革發(fā)展滯后以及地方政府的腐敗等（Shambaugh ，2000；
Chapman ，2002）。

　　這些論點(diǎn)之所以缺乏說服力，就在于它們都假設(shè)中央政府對(duì)上述問題一無所知。但顯然，中國的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人非常清楚，促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的某些政策已經(jīng)削弱了中央政府對(duì)國民的日常生活和信息的控制。事實(shí)上，改革的目的之一就是要發(fā)揮地方政府的積極性、推動(dòng)地方的創(chuàng)新，同時(shí)鼓勵(lì)跨國公司進(jìn)入中國市場，以引入新的思想和技術(shù)。此外，盡管中國的政治制度與西方有異，但政府仍然鼓勵(lì)人們就那些阻礙經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的現(xiàn)行政策提出批評(píng)。在中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會(huì)議上，學(xué)者們關(guān)于各級(jí)政府政策的討論的激烈和廣泛程度不亞于美國經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會(huì)。

　　為了適應(yīng)不斷變化的經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢和社會(huì)形勢，中國共產(chǎn)黨的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人也在不斷調(diào)整其核心目標(biāo)，并與那些處在中國經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)型前沿的精英階層開展合作。這一調(diào)整過程在中國共產(chǎn)黨的新口號(hào)——“三個(gè)代表”——上就可以反映出來。該思想是2000年春提出來的，它取代了中國共產(chǎn)黨先前的“三大革命階級(jí)”（即農(nóng)民、工人和士兵）的思想�！叭齻�(gè)代表”的思想對(duì)中國共產(chǎn)黨作了這樣的定位：（1）始終代表先進(jìn)的社會(huì)生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展要求；
（2）始終代表中國的先進(jìn)文化的前進(jìn)方向；
（3）始終代表中國的最廣大人民的根本利益。為了與那些推動(dòng)中國社會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)型的精英階層建立更緊密的聯(lián)系，中國共產(chǎn)黨還鼓勵(lì)建立各種與政府緊密合作的商業(yè)和職業(yè)組織。不僅如此，中國共產(chǎn)黨還對(duì)黨員構(gòu)成進(jìn)行了改革，吸納了大量商界、社會(huì)以及學(xué)術(shù)界的人才。在1982年以來的20年中，具有大學(xué)文憑的中央委員人數(shù)從剛過50%上升到了近99%（Dickson ，2003a 和b ）。

　　在2002年11月召開的中共十六大上，省級(jí)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)們成了中央政治局的生力軍，占到了總?cè)藬?shù)的42%.相反，政治局成員中軍界的代表僅占8%，中央黨政機(jī)關(guān)的成員則為25%.由于省級(jí)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在國家政策的討論中占了重要地位，尤其是很多中央領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人也都是從省級(jí)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人中提拔的，那么關(guān)于中央政府和省級(jí)政府之間會(huì)發(fā)生沖突的說法就沒有太多意義了（Bo，2004）。

　　有些分析家認(rèn)為中央政府絲毫不關(guān)心公眾的意見。然而，大量翔實(shí)的證據(jù)否定了這一論調(diào)。自20世紀(jì)90年代末以來，中國的各級(jí)地方政府和省政府在制定經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)政策時(shí)都開始采納民意調(diào)查的意見。對(duì)政府政策的學(xué)術(shù)討論也非�；钴S，評(píng)論者與政府最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人之間的互動(dòng)很頻繁。有關(guān)的社會(huì)調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn)的問題與學(xué)術(shù)界和國外分析人士的擔(dān)憂大致相同，具體都包括腐敗的蔓延、發(fā)展不平衡擴(kuò)大、失業(yè)率居高不下、賦稅過重以及養(yǎng)老金的拖欠等。但在另一方面，這些調(diào)查也反映出絕大多數(shù)人對(duì)于中央政府都持支持態(tài)度，他們堅(jiān)信法院、媒體以及政府機(jī)關(guān)會(huì)對(duì)他們的困難采取負(fù)責(zé)任的態(tài)度（Pei ，2001；
Lin 等人，2002；
China Newsweek，2005）[4].

　　公眾對(duì)政府的信心反映出，中國人的生活水平普遍得到了改善（67%的人認(rèn)為得到了改善，(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　12%的人認(rèn)為惡化了，還有20%的人認(rèn)為沒有變化）。對(duì)于生活水平是否會(huì)繼續(xù)改善，人們所持的信念也很相似。根據(jù)另一個(gè)調(diào)查結(jié)果，農(nóng)村地區(qū)的樂觀度比城市還高（前者為75%，后者為68%）。因此，盡管政府會(huì)逐漸完善司法和行政體系，但政治改革的推動(dòng)還會(huì)是相當(dāng)謹(jǐn)慎的。公眾對(duì)政府的普遍支持不僅反映了各級(jí)政府能正視人們的疾苦，而且表明當(dāng)?shù)胤秸�府不能快速有效解決民生疾苦時(shí)，中央政府會(huì)迅速進(jìn)行干預(yù)。此外，這種信心也來自20多年以來絕大多數(shù)家庭的收入都經(jīng)歷了快速的增長（Fewsmith，2003）[5].

　　群眾普遍受惠于經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，加上政府對(duì)公眾意見的重視，尤其是對(duì)民生疾苦的關(guān)注，將保證中國的政治穩(wěn)定持續(xù)下去。北京申辦2008年奧運(yùn)會(huì)的成功就證明了中國政權(quán)的穩(wěn)定以及領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的信心。另一個(gè)證明來自中國一直不斷鼓勵(lì)自己的學(xué)生到美國和歐洲的大學(xué)深造。在未來幾十年里，中國對(duì)國內(nèi)自由會(huì)采取逐步放開的政策。這些發(fā)展會(huì)使未來的政治制度走向何方還有待觀察。但無論如何，政府對(duì)公眾意見所抱有的負(fù)責(zé)任的態(tài)度表明，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)長期持續(xù)增長所需要的政治穩(wěn)定是有可能維持下去的。

　�。ɡ钍缙甲g 吳素萍校）

　　注釋：

　　*本文從CES 會(huì)議、芝加哥伊利諾伊大學(xué)、芝加哥大學(xué)以及西北大學(xué)研討班受益匪淺，此外，A.J.Aiseirithe 、Louis Cain、Thomas Chappelear 、Jack Goldstone、James Heckman、Justin Lin以及Werner Troesken 也為本文提供了很多有益的建議。本文僅代表作者個(gè)人的觀點(diǎn)，不代表國民經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局（NBER）的立場�！�—作者注

　　**本文作者Robert W.Fogel 為1993年諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主，《比較》第5輯曾發(fā)表了他的《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)與時(shí)俱進(jìn)》一文�！�—編者注。

　　1，關(guān)于有可能阻礙中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長目標(biāo)的經(jīng)濟(jì)因素的討論可參見Shane （2005）；
Zakaria（2005）；
R.Wang （2005）；
The Economist （2004a ，2004b ，2005a ）；
Prasad（2004）

　　2，表1中的分解分析所采用的數(shù)據(jù)來源于《2003年中國統(tǒng)計(jì)年鑒》第26頁、27頁、第313頁。由于沒有GDP 平減指數(shù)，我們采用了零售價(jià)格定基指數(shù)以獲得實(shí)際GDP.由于等式（1）中微分逼近值的總和與的值不太一致，因此在計(jì)算LFRP、行業(yè)間勞動(dòng)力流動(dòng)以及部門內(nèi)生產(chǎn)率的變化對(duì)人均收入總體變化的貢獻(xiàn)時(shí)，我們將等式右邊各項(xiàng)的和作為分母。

　　3，其他八國集團(tuán)國家公布的數(shù)據(jù)的相對(duì)指數(shù)與表2所顯示的美國的數(shù)據(jù)有所不同，但沒有實(shí)質(zhì)性區(qū)別。若采用其他國家的數(shù)據(jù)并不會(huì)根本上推翻分析結(jié)論。我在表2中之所以采用的是美國的數(shù)據(jù)是因?yàn)楹芸赡苊绹�的�?shù)據(jù)也低估了勞動(dòng)升級(jí)對(duì)中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的影響。OECD提供的其他6個(gè)八國集團(tuán)成員國在1997、1998或1999年的數(shù)據(jù)如下：

　　由于某些原因，上表中美國的指數(shù)值與表2中存在差別。該表中的數(shù)值算是以男性和女性的平均收入為基礎(chǔ)計(jì)算的，而表2中的數(shù)值則是僅以男性收入的中間數(shù)為基礎(chǔ)的。此外，上表中的年齡段不包括65歲及以上人士。上表中的年限為1997年、1998年或1999年，不包括2000年。不過兩個(gè)表最重要的區(qū)別在于上表中采用的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是12年級(jí)以下而非9年級(jí)以下。需要注意的是，在表2中，具有大學(xué)學(xué)歷的人的收入與只有高中文憑的人的收入之比為173.但在本表中，該比率為181.

　　4，其他有關(guān)政治壓力和回應(yīng)的有趣研究包括Huang （1995）；
Chapman （2002）；
Gong（2005）；
D.Wang （2005）；
以及Bremmer （2005）。

　　5，還需要注意的是Fareed Zakaria對(duì)自由民主、非自由民主和自由專制所做的區(qū)別。

　　自由民主的特征不僅包括競選，而且還體現(xiàn)在政府會(huì)竭力保護(hù)公民的自由和尊嚴(yán)而非強(qiáng)權(quán)統(tǒng)治，對(duì)各級(jí)政府的權(quán)力進(jìn)行監(jiān)督并保證法律面前人人平等。非自由民主也有競選制度，但選舉出的政府會(huì)利用手中的權(quán)力壓制人們的言論和集會(huì)自由，并對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)行為進(jìn)行限制。

　　自由專制實(shí)行一黨制，但同時(shí)給予公民有限的政治權(quán)利并改善了一國的經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況、社會(huì)狀況和公民權(quán)利狀況。他提出，目前大多數(shù)東亞國家的政府“都是民主主義、自由主義、資本主義、寡頭統(tǒng)治和腐敗的混合產(chǎn)物——就像1900年左右西方國家的政府”（Zakaria ，1997，第28頁；
Zakaria ，2003；
也可參見The Ecolnomist，2005b ）。

　　英文原文：

　　Why China is Likely to Achieve its Growth Objectives

　　Robert W.Fogel

　　Working Paper 12122

　　http://www.nber.org/papers/w12122

　　NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

　　Issued in March 2006

　　1050Massachusetts Avenue ，Cambridge ，MA 02138，

　　I have benefitted from discussions at the CES meeting ，seminars at the Universityof Illinois Chicago ，the University of Chicago ，and Northwestern University ，and from suggestions by AJ Aiseirithe ，Louis Cain，Thomas Chappelear ，Jack Goldstone，James Heckman ，Justin Lin，and Werner Troesken.The views expressed herein arethose of the author （s ）and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NationalBureau of Economic Research.

　　⊙copyright 2006by Robert W.Fogel.All rights reserved.Short sections oftext，not to exceed two paragraphs，may be quoted without explicit permission providedthat full credit，including .notice，is given to the source.

　　Abstract

　　In 2002，the Chinese Communist Party announced a goal of quadrupling per capitaincome by the year 2020.Starting at income levels of the year 2000，this wouldrequire a growth rate of 7.2percent per annum in per capita income or close to8.0percent in GDP.Such unresolved and emerging problems as growing income disparities，increasing pollution，pressures on infrastructure ，the inefficiency of state ownedenterprises ，and political instability are often cited as reasons to doubt theattainability of the CCP‘s goal.However ，China ’s progress in addressing fundamentalconstraints that might limit rapid economic growth augurs well for the success ofits economic goals.Although there are disagreements about economic policy amongtop leaders ，the continued transformation into a market economy and the promotionof increasing local autonomy in economic matters are not in doubt.In education ，China has substantially increased the percentage of its workforce receiving a collegeeducation ，and continuing growth in this investment in human capital could accountfor a large portion of the desired growth rate.In addition ，the value of improvementsin the quality of economic output unmeasured by GDP ，such as advances in the qualityof health care and education，could raise reported growth rates by as much as 60percent.Finally，the government‘s increasing sensitivity to public opinion andissues of inequality and corruption ，combined with improving living conditions ，have resulted in a level of popular confidence in the government that makes politicalinstability unlikely.

　　Robert W.Fogel ，The University of Chicago ，Graduate School of Business 5807South Woodlawn Avenue Chicago ，IL 60637and NBER ，rwf@cpe.uchicago.edu，

　　Why China Is Likely to Achieve Its Growth Objectives

　　In 2002，the Chinese Communist Party announced a goal of quadrupling per capitaincome by the year 2020.Starting at income levels of the year 2000，this wouldrequire a growth rate of 7.2percent per annum in per capita income or close to8.0percent in GDP（M.Wang 2005）。Is China likely to meet that objective？Thatquestion has been a subject of debate in Asia ，Europe，and America ，with an arrayof both pessimistic and optimistic views.

　　In this paper I present some reasons for joining the optimists.(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　Indeed，I willargue that China‘s GDP is likely to grow at rates of 8percent per annum or morefor a least a generation—that is ，to 2030—and perhaps beyond that date.Beforegetting into substantive issues about the economic，structural，and political problemsthat will have to be overcome if the growth objectives are to be met，it is usefulto look at some numbers in order to set the context for analysis.

　　Exceptionally rapid rates of growth have been achieved by several poor Asiancountries for relatively long stretches of time since World War II.During the twentyyears from 1950to 1970，Japan grew at an average annual rate of 8.4percent inper capita income ，increasing its per capita income more than sixfold，an achievementthat is 50percent higher than the goal set by the Chinese leadership.Over thetwenty years between 1960and 1980，Singapore ‘s growth in per capita income averaged7.3percent.The corresponding figure for South Korea between 1965and 1985was7.6percent ，and Taiwan-China averaged 7.2percent over the same period.Even Chinaexceeded its new growth target over the 22-year period from 1980to 2002，when theachieved growth rate averaged 8.2percent per annum （Fogel 2004b ）。So the targetset by the leadership is well within the experience of the rapidly growing economiesof Southeast Asia.

　　However ，those who question whether the new goal is achievable do so not becausethey are unaware of the past experience of nations within the region，but becausethey doubt that China will be able to replicate the experience of past leaders betweennow and 2020.The doubts arise from beliefs that unresolved or emerging economic，political ，and international problems are likely to reduce the recent growth ratesubstantially.One of the economic issues is the shaky state of the banking system，which is saddled with a high proportion of nonperforming loans.The inefficiencyand unprofitability of many state-owned enterprises （SOEs）is also seen as a threatto future growth.Another problem is the growth in income disparities between therapidly growing coastal provinces and the more slowly growing interior provinces，between urban and rural labor ，and between highly skilled and manual labor （cf.Heckman 2005）。There are also bottlenecks in infrastructure，including pressureon fuel supplies and electrical power ，and the growth of environmental pollution.Although concern over the capacity of China to feed itself has diminished ，concernover the adequacy of water supplies has risen.This is not an exhaustive list ofthe potential economic impediments to a continued high rate of economic growth，but it captures some of the main concerns.1

　　Although I recognize the importance of these issues ，I shall not dwell on themat this point.I view them as issues that need to be addressed during the courseof economic growth and，for reasons that I discuss in the second half of the paper，I believe that they will be addressed.

　　They are certainly on the “to do ”lists of China‘s political leaders andtheir economic advisors ，who stress the need for reducing social and economic imbalances.My initial focus is on more fundamental constraints to sustaining rapid economicgrowth for another generation ，constraints that might undermine long-term growthprospects even if all the right things are done to resolve the current litany ofproblems.

　　To get at these potentially more binding constraints it is useful to disaggregatethe sources of growth in per capita income between 1978and 2002.The process isfacilitated by equations（1）and （2）in Figure 1.Equation （1）is merely anidentity which states that the level of per capita income is equal to output perworker multiplied by the labor force participation rate.In equation（1）the outputof the economy is divided into three sectors：agriculture ，industry，and services.Labor productivity in each sector is weighted by that sector‘s share of the laborforce.

　　Equation（2）is the rate of growth transformation of equation（1）。It saysthat the rate of growth in per capita income is a weighted average of the sum ofthe rate of change in the labor share and of labor productivity of each sector plusthe rate of change in the labor force participation rate.The sectoral weights arethe mid-period shares of income originating in each sector.

　　Table 1shows that 69percent of the growth in per capita income between 1978and 2002was due to increases in labor productivity within each of the three mainsectors of the economy.2The rise in labor productivity was most rapid in industry（6.2percent per annum ）despite the inefficient state-owned enterprises and theinefficiencies in the allocation of capital.As Lin and Tsai（2004，355-356）havepointed out ，the policy of gradually shifting from central control appears to havebeen more effective than the“big bang”approach.By sequencing reforms that successivelyenlarged the scope of the market sector ，even the SOEs shifted most of their purchasesand sales to market prices rather than plan prices.

　　Table 1also shows that while changes in labor productivity were highest inthe industrial sector ，(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　they were nearly as high in agriculture （5.7percent inagriculture as compared to 6.2percent in industry）。Moreover，this high rate ofgrowth in agricultural productivity has been sustained for more than two decades.Table 2shows that although China ‘s rate of growth in agricultural labor productivityover a two-decade period is not unprecedented ，it is at the high end of experiencein both Asia and Europe.Only Korea exceeded the Chinese growth in agriculturallabor productivity between 1980and 1997，but in contrast to China，most of theKorean agricultural labor force had already shifted into industry and services.In the Chinese case ，half of the labor force is still in agriculture ，so the interindustryeffect might yet prove to be substantial.Indeed，it is likely to be somewhat largerin the next two decades than it was between 1980and 2000.

　　Since about 30percent of China ‘s growth rate is likely to continue to comefrom interindustry shifts and modest increases in the labor force participationrate（cf.Johnson 2000），growth rates of labor productivity within sectors needonly average about 5percent per year.

　　Several factors suggest that such growth rates are likely.Despite the remarkableadvances of recent decades，the average technology is still well below best prevailingpractice in each of the three sectors.Hence，growth in each sector will be stimulatedby the diffusion of the best prevailing practice.Moreover，the frontier of technologyis moving out rapidly ，especially in the industrial and service sectors，but alsoin agriculture.Third ，the investment in capital ，especially human capital，iscapable of rapid improvement in the next several decades.Finally ，despite thepreoccupation with possible overstatement of the Chinese growth rate due to inflatedestimates of growth sent from localities，on balance it is likely that the trueChinese growth rate is understated，especially in the service sector，due to thefailure adequately to account for improvements in the quality of output and theunderreporting of small firms.I now want to elaborate briefly on these last twofactors and assess their likely impact on growth rates over the next two or threedecades.

　　The Role of Factor Enhancement

　　Table 3presents enrollment ratios in primary ，secondary ，and tertiary schoolsfor 1980，1990，1997，and 2000.China is compared with seven Asian nations，fourWestern European nations，and the United States.At the primary level ，China ‘s ratios exceed those of all the other nations.At the secondary level China comparesfavorably with the other newly industrializing countries（NICs），but it is behindSouth Korea ，Japan ，Western Europe，and the United States.However，the gap diminishedrapidly between 1990and 1997.In this brief span the enrollment ratio at the secondarylevel increased by over 40percent.China lags furthest behind the rich nationsat the tertiary level.There its enrollment level is between 15and 27percent ofenrollment levels in Korea，Japan ，Western Europe，and the United States.However，once again it is rapidly closing the gap.Between 1990and 2004the Chinese tertiaryenrollment ratio sextupled（China Statistical Yearbook 2005）。

　　It is possible to quantify the impact of enhancing the quality of labor througheducation on the growth rate of per capita income by making use of the equationsshown in Figure 2.Equation （3）is a factor-augmenting production function inwhich .L and .K are indexes of labor and capital augmentation （in this discussionI will focus only on labor augmentation ）。Equation（4）merely rearranges equation（3）to put it in a more convenient form.The dependent variable is now labor productivityand the term in square brackets brings the augmentation indexes together with theindex of total factor productivity.Equation（5）is the rate of growth transformationof equation （4）。It indicates that when all other variables are held constant，labor productivity will grow at the rate of growth of labor augmentation multipliedby labor‘s share in income.

　　Table 4presents the information needed to implement equation （5）。The toppart presents an index of the relative productivity of labor with primary ，highschool，and college degrees.The index is based on the income of U.S.males by educationlevel.It indicates that a college-educated worker is 3.1times as productive ，and a high school graduate is 1.8times as productive ，as a worker with less thana ninth-grade education.3The bottom half of the table indicates the contributionof various scenarios of increases in enrollment ratios.Labor enhancement wouldgrow at the rate of 1.8percent per annum if the secondary ratio reached one hundredin 20years.

　　Multiplying this figure by the labor share indicates that such an achievementwould add about 1.1percent to the growth rate of labor productivity.Labor enhancementwould grow at 7.4percent per annum if the tertiary ratio rose from 6to 25in thenext twenty years ，which would put the tertiary level of education in China atabout where the Western European nations were in 1980.That level of labor augmentationwould add 4.(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　4percent to the growth rate of labor productivity，and by itself wouldaccount for over 60percent of the target set in 2002.With a more ambitious expansionof higher education ，reaching enrollment ratios of 50in 20years，labor augmentationwould grow at 11.2percent.The rate of investment in human capital would by itselfadd 6.7percent to the overall growth rate.These targets for higher education arenot out of reach.It should be remembered that as recently as 1980，the WesternEuropean nations had ratios of about 25.Only the United States was above 50.Themovement to enrollment ratios of 50in Western Europe was a product of the lasttwo decades of the twentieth century.In the case of the U.K.，two-thirds of theincrease from 19to 52percent took place between 1990and 1997.

　　The significance of investment in human capital as an engine of economic growthhas not eluded the State Council.In 1998Jiang Zemin called for a massive increasein enrollments in higher education.The response was swift：over the next four yearsenrollment in higher education increased by 165percent （from 3.4million to 9.0million ）and the number of students studying abroad also rose by 152percent（China Statistical Yearbook 2003）。It is currently estimated that by 2010atleast 20percent of high school graduates will be enrolled in institutions of highereducation and the long run target is 50percent by 2050.The tertiary enrollmentratio increased by about 50percent between 2000and 2004（from 12.5to 19.0percent），so the calculations shown in Table 4may well be too conservative （China StatisticalYearbook 2005）。China currently has about 20million students enrolled in highereducation ，which exceeds current U.S.enrollments by about 60percent.（Newcomb2005；
U.S.Statistical Abstract 2005）。It is estimated that in 2005-6China willproduce 3.3million college graduates ，India 3.1million ，and the United States1.3million （Colvin 2005）。However ，in advancing the frontier of scientifictraining，the United States still has a considerable lead.

　　Errors in the Measurement of Output

　　So far I have focused mainly on factor enhancement to support my contentionthat China is likely to achieve its growth targets.I want to turn now to the problemsof measurement on the output side of equation （5）。Errors in the measurementof national income from the output side have become increasingly severe.It is nowclear that official estimates of GDP for the United States badly underestimate U.S.economic growth because they do not take into account improvements in the qualityof output ，especially in such services as education and health care.Children insecondary schools are taught more about science and technology today than postgraduatecollege students used to be taught a generation ago ，let alone two generationsago.

　　Even more dramatic are the improvements in health care.A century and a halfago ，people in their late thirties and early forties were more afflicted by chronicdisabilities than people in their late sixties and early seventies are today.Notonly has the average age at onset of disabilities been delayed by a decade or so，but once disabilities appear，there are now numerous effective interventions.Hernias，which used to be permanent and exceedingly painful conditions afflicting one outof every four males ，can now be repaired by a surgical procedure that in the UnitedStates requires hospitalization for only 23hours.Other areas where medical interventionshave been highly effective include treatment of genito-urinary conditions ，controlof hypertension and reduction in the incidence of stroke，replacement of knee andhip joints，curing of cataracts ，and chemotherapies that reduce the incidence ofosteoporosis and heart disease（Fogel 2004a ）。

　　Yet most of these great advances in health care and education are overlookedin the GDP accounts ，because the values of these sectors are measured by inputsinstead of by output.An hour of a doctor\"s time is considered no more effectivetoday than an hour of a doctor\"s time was half a century ago，before the age ofantibiotics and modern surgery.It has recently been estimated that the value ofimprovements in health care ，if properly measured，are at least twice the costof health care，but such calculations have not yet made their way into the GDP accounts（Cutler and McClellan 2001；
Murphy and Topel 2003；
Nordhaus 2003）。

　　In the case of the United States，my own rough estimates indicate that allowingfor such factors as the increase in leisure time，the improvement in the qualityof health care，and the improvements in the quality of education would come closeto doubling the U.S.annual growth rate of per capita income over the past century（from 2.0to 3.6percent per annum ）。

　　What is the implication of these statistics for understanding the change instandards of living for the typical American？If we use the conventional measureof growth ，the real income of the typical American in 2000was 7times greaterthan it was in 1900.However，if an adjusted measure is used，Americans in 2000had real incomes that were 34times greater than in 1900.(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　In other words，80percentof the goods and services that Americans enjoy today are outside of the measuredeconomy （Fogel 2000and 2004a）。

　　What is the implication of the failure to take account of improvements in thequality of output for the measurement of Chinese economic growth？In China the mainincreases in life expectancy took place before the onset of the period of reform.Between 1950and 1980，life expectancy at birth increased from 40.8to 67.8years.By 2000life expectancy stood at about 71.4，an increase of about 0.18years oflife expectancy per calendar year during the period of accelerated economic reform（Keyfitz and Flieger 1990；
China Statistical Yearbook 2003）。Studies of the valueof a statistical life year in rich and poor nations suggest that the value of anadditional year of life in China is about 3.5times per capita income （see ，e.g.，Murphy and Topel 2002；
Viscusi and Aldy 2003）。Hence ，the value of the unmeasuredimprovements in life expectancy may have been high enough to raise the rate of economicgrowth between 1980and 2000by about 60percent.If the true growth of GDP between2000and 2040is 13percent instead of 8percent，then the true size of the Chineseeconomy in 2040will be about 6times the size of the measured economy.Of course，if both the United States and China similarly neglect changes of quality in theirmeasurements，the relative ranking of the two economies may not be changed significantly.

　　Will Political Instability Undermine Economic Growth？

　　So far I have focused purely on economic issues.Some analysts argue that politicalinstability is a serious impediment to China‘s ability to maintain high rates ofeconomic growth.Several scenarios have been outlined in which political factorscould thwart economic goals.

　　Some of these scenarios begin with an economic breakdown brought on by a sharpcyclical downturn that would raise unemployment and undermine a precarious socialstability.Others warn that a growing social unrest has been brought on by the financialproblems and inefficiencies of the state-owned enterprises.These problems havenot only led to rising urban unemployment but have also resulted in the failureto pay promised wages ，pensions，health-care allowances，and housing allowances（Bremmer 2005；
Chaohua 2005）。Still others warn of an impending breakdown in thebanking system，which is beset by a huge burden of nonperforming loans，a breakdownthat could undermine the microeconomic stability of the economy （Garnaut and Song2004）。

　　Other threats to stability that have been observed include：widespread corruption；
internal power struggles；
bubbles in real estate，international trade ，and steel（among other products）；
inequality between the urban and rural areas，betweenthe coastal and interior provinces，between the highly educated elites and poorlyeducated masses ，and between the Han majority and the ethnic minorities.One uniquewarning singles out the sharp rise in the sex ratio concentrated at ages 15–34，which ，it is argued，will translate into high rates of crime and violence and maypromote concubinage.Some single out international tensions ，particularly overTaiwan，which divert the attention of the leadership from their growth objectives（Pei 2005；
Bradsher 2004；
Dunphy 2004，Hu 2000；
Lim 2004；
Business Asia 2002；
McGregor 2004；
Wilson 2004；
EIU ViewsWire 2004）。

　　When speculating about the future ，the range of possible scenarios is virtuallyunlimited.The point at issue is not what might occur ，but what is likely to occur.Moreover，many of the problems singled out are of long standing ，such as the inefficiencyof many state-owned enterprises.While these SOEs may be a drag on the economy，China has nevertheless been able to grow at over 8percent per capita for a quarterof a century.The idea that these inefficient firms will suddenly go bankrupt isfar-fetched.The policy of the State Council has been to gradually phase them outor to reorganize them on a profitable basis so as not to sharply increase unemployment.Not only does the government have the finances needed to continue subsidizing inefficientfirms if it chooses to do so for economic or political reasons，but the burden ofthese subsidies will also gradually diminish，because the share of the industrialoutput supplied by these underperforming SOEs will gradually decline and the burdenof a given level of subsidies will rapidly diminish with the economy growing sorapidly.

　　These points also apply to the problem of the state banks.Although the proportionof nonperforming loans may be about 35percent，China is not in immediate dangerof a collapse of its banking system.It is within the power of the government toremove this burden.The banks originally became saddled with the bad paper becausethe government obliged the banks to finance unprofitable SOEs.The inefficienciesand distortions in the economy produced by banking policies have been relieved bythe large injection of foreign direct investment，encouraged by government policy，which has also facilitated the transfer of advanced technologies to China.(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　Withdirect investment going largely into large-scale industry ，the banks have beenable to supply part of the capital needed by small-scale enterprises（Lin ，Cai ，and Li 2003；
Fan 2005）。Movements in the direction of more effectively using themonetary system to manage business cycles ，and contemplated reforms in capitalmarkets ，should also alleviate economic distortions.For example ，the governmentrecently restructured two of the four largest state-owned banks to bring their capitalposition up to international standards.Most important，perhaps ，is the very lowlevel of government indebtedness（less than a fifth of GDP），which gives the StateCouncil leeway to pursue needed stabilization policies，including a rapid restructuringof the banking system ，instead of the gradual policy of reform it is currentlypursuing（Lin ，Cai ，and Li 2003；
Fan 2005）。

　　Although there are disagreements about economic policy among the top leaders，the proposition that China should continue to transform itself into a market economyis not at issue.

　　Nor is there disagreement over the policy of promoting increasing autonomy ineconomic decisions as a lever of rapid economic growth.As many analysts have pointedout ，the government is unified around a policy that has been called“market preservingfederalism.”This Chinese form of federalism limits the central government ‘scontrol over economic decision making ，promotes creative competition among localgovernments ，constrains rent seeking ，and provides an array of incentives to inducecreative local enterprises.This type of federalism is also apparent in the designof the tax system ，which has been called “fiscal federalism ，”and which is aimedat preventing taxation from stifling economic growth.In the tax reform of 1994，the central government limited its primary administration to VAT and taxes on centrallyowned enterprises.It also set up local tax bureaus under the direction of localgovernments to supervise income taxes.While much remains to be done in the designof the fiscal system，especially with respect to narrowing regional inequalities，these issues are on the leadership’s agenda of needed reforms.The central leadershipis also aware of the danger that local autonomy may move in counterproductive waysthat promote rent seeking ，moral hazard，and other forms of corruption ，and thatit must monitor performance and penalize corruption where possible.The successfulunfolding of autonomy requires a center strong enough to integrate national andlocal goals ，to discipline local authorities whose corrupt practices threaten theprogress of reform，and to provide rewards to those who advance it（Lin ，Cai ，and Li 2003；
Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2003；
Blanchard and Shleifer 2000；
Montinola，Qian，and Weingast 1996；
Krug，Zhu ，and Hendrischke 2003）。

　　Some analysts argue that unless China permits competing political parties ，powerful pressures will build up between the provinces and the center that willundermine political stability and thwart continued high rates of economic growth.Others argue that the unsolved inequalities have also built up pressures at thegrass roots that threaten to become unmanageable（Goldstone 1995；
Ohman 1995；
Esarey2002）。Other issues stressed by analysts include mounting environmental hazards，lagging development of public health programs ，and endemic corruption（Shambaugh2000；
Chapman 2002）。

　　The difficulty with these arguments is that they assume that the leaders ofthe CCP and the State Council are unaware of these problems.The leaders are quitewell aware that the successes of their growth policies have weakened the centralgovernment‘s control over daily life and access to information.Indeed ，one purposeof the reforms was to promote creativity at the local level by promoting local initiativeand by encouraging the entry of global firms into the Chinese market in order tofacilitate new ideas and technologies.Moreover ，critiques of current policiesthat hamper economic growth are encouraged，although competitive political partiesare prohibited.Debates over governmental policies at all levels are as vigorousand wide-ranging at the meetings of the Chinese Economists Society as they are atthe American Economic Association.

　　The leaders of the CCP have responded to the changing economic and social conditionsby changing the central goal of the CCP and by co-opting the elites who are at theforefront of China‘s economic and social transformation.This process of adaptationis reflected in the new slogan of the CCP ，“Three Represents，”introduced byJiang Zemin in the spring of 2000to replace the previous slogan of “Three RevolutionaryClasses ”（peasants，workers ，and soldiers）。

　　The new slogan portrays the CCP as：（1）the embodiment of society ‘s mostadvanced productive forces；
（2）the promoter of an advanced culture ；
and （3）

　　representing the needs and interests of the great majority of the Chinese population.To extend its connections with the elites who are bringing about the transformationof China，the CCP encouraged the formation of a wide array of new business and professionalsocieties with strong ties to the state.(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　It also transformed the membership of theCCP ，bringing into its fold the technocratic leaders of business ，social，andintellectual life.During the two decades following 1982，the proportion of theCentral Committee members holding college degrees increased from a little over halfto nearly 99percent（Dickson 2003a and b ）。

　　The 16th Congress of the CCP，which met in November 2002，made provincial leadersthe most prominent group in the Politburo ，representing 42percent of its membership.By contrast ，the military represented only 8percent of the Politburo，and centralparty institutions accounted for 25percent.The balance of the Politburo membershipcame from Shanghai political circles or from institutions other than provincialleaderships or central government institutions.Given the dominant role of provincialleaders in the shaping of national policy ，it makes little sense to dwell on thepossibility of a conflict between the national and provincial leaders ，especiallywhen many of the central leaders came from provincial posts （Bo 2004）。

　　Some analysts argue that leaders of the CCP and the State Council are out oftouch with public opinion.However，the weight of evidence contradicts that view.Local and provincial governments have been using polling techniques to determinepublic opinion on an array of economic and social issues since the late 1980s.Academiccritics of government policies abound and interactions between these critics andtop government leaders are numerous.The range of problems raised by respondentsto surveys mirrors the complaints of academic critics and foreign analysts，includingwidespread corruption ，increasing inequality ，persistent unemployment ，burdensometaxes ，and unpaid pensions.Nevertheless ，the polls also reveal majority supportfor the central government and overwhelming belief that the courts，the press ，and government institutions will be responsive to their grievances（Pei 2001；
Linet al.2002；
China Newsweek 2005）。4

　　Popular confidence in the government reflects the widespread belief among theChinese that their living conditions have improved（67percent better ，12percentworse ，20percent no change）。The level of confidence about whether living conditionswill continue to improve is similar.According to another poll，optimism about thefuture is slightly higher in rural areas（75percent）than in the cities（68percent）。Hence ，it is not surprising that political reform is quite limited ，although thereis an expectation that the government will gradually improve legal and governmentalinstitutions.This generally favorable view of government not only reflects thepragmatic responses of leaders at all levels of government to grievances，but alsothe frequent intervention of the central government with local officials when theyare too slow to respond to complaints.It also reflects the rapid increases in incomeexperienced by the great majority of households for more than a quarter of a century（Fewsmith 2003）。5

　　This combination of widely shared economic advances and governmental attentionto public opinion ，especially with respect to grievances ，is a formula for continuedpolitical stability.One indication of the stability of the regime and the self-confidenceof its leaders is its successful bid for the 2008Olympic Games.Another is itsencouragement of Chinese students to enroll in American and European universities.The gradual loosening of constraints on expression in China is likely to continueover the next several decades.Whether or not these developments lead to a multipartysystem of the American type remains to be seen.However ，the government‘s responsivenessto popular concerns indicates that political stability is likely to remain at thelevel required for continued long-term economic growth.

　　Notes

　　1.Discussions of economic impediments that may foil the growth targets of Chinaare summarized in Shane 2005；
Zakaria 2005；
Morrison 2005；
R.Wang 2005；
Economist2004a ，2004b ，2005a ；
Prasad 2004.

　　2.The disaggregation shown in Table 1is based on data from the China StatisticalYearbook 2003，pp.26，27，313.In the absence of a GDP deflator ，the retail fixed-baseprice index was used to obtain real GDP.Because the differential approximationshown in equation （1）does not quite add up to Y，the sum of the terms on theright-hand side of the equation was used as the denominator when computing the contributionof changes in the LFPR，in inter-industry shifts in the labor force ，and in within-sectorproductivity to the overall change in per capita income.

　　3.The relative index for other G-8countries reporting data were somewhat differentfrom those shown for the United States in Table 2，but not materially so.Theiruse would not materially change the analysis.I prefer the U.S.figures as reportedin Table 2because it is likely that even they underestimate the impact of labor-augmentationon Chinese economic growth.The data reported by OECD for 6of the G-8countriesfor 1997，1998，or 1999are as follows：

　　Canada France Germany Italy UK U.S.

　　Less than 12th grade 100100100100100100

　　(點(diǎn)擊此處閱讀下一頁)

　　High-school graduate 120119128172154149

　　B.A.or higher degree 183201201—263269

　　Source：Sherman ，Honegger，and McGivern 2003，Table A31.

　　The values of the U.S.index in this table differ from those in Table 2forseveral reasons.

　　The values here are based on average income over both sexes rather than themedian income for men only.The age range here excludes persons aged 65and over.The years used here are 1997，1998，or 1999rather than 2000.But the most importantfactor is that the base here is less than twelfth grade rather than less than ninthgrade.It should be noted that in Table 2，the ratio of the income of persons withcollege degrees to those with high school degrees is 173.In this note it is 181.

　　4.Other interesting discussions of political stresses and responses includeHuang 1995；
Chapman 2002；
Gong 2005；
D.Wang 2005；
and Bremmer 2005.

　　5.It is also worth noting the distinction made by Fareed Zakaria between liberaldemocracies ，illiberal democracies ，and liberalizing autocracies.Liberal democraciesare not only marked by contested elections，but also by governments that seek toprotect the autonomy and dignity of individuals against coercion，create checkson the power of various branches of government，and establish equality under law.Illiberal democracies have contested elections but the elected governments use theirpower to repress speech and assembly and to restrict economic and social behavior.Liberalizing autocracies have one-party systems but have permitted individuals limitedpolitical rights and have improved the spheres of economic，social，and civil rights.He argues that most East Asian governments today“are a mix of democracy，liberalism，capitalism，oligarchy ，and corruption—much like Western governments circa 1900”（Zakaria 1997，28；
cf.Zakaria 2003.See also Economist 2005b）。

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　　羅伯特·福格爾（Robert Fogel）簡介

　　1926年福格爾出生在紐約市。福格爾1944年進(jìn)入康奈爾大學(xué)，1948年獲得學(xué)士學(xué)位。在哥倫比亞大學(xué)繼續(xù)深造并于1960年在那里得到碩士學(xué)位。1963年在約翰·霍普金斯大學(xué)獲得博士學(xué)位。在康奈爾期間，福格爾的興趣從物理和化學(xué)轉(zhuǎn)向經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和歷史。在四十年代后半期對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)前途普遍悲觀，也促使他的注意力轉(zhuǎn)移。

　　福格爾1958年在約翰·霍普金斯大學(xué)開始執(zhí)教，但于1959年又轉(zhuǎn)到羅切斯特大學(xué)。1964年他進(jìn)入芝加哥大學(xué)，1965年在那里任經(jīng)濟(jì)史教授。1965年，他同時(shí)兼任羅切斯特大學(xué)的教授職位，1975年他把兩個(gè)職位都辭去，而到哈佛大學(xué)任教授。但是，對(duì)他來說，既要任人口經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中心的理事，又要兼瓦格林基金會(huì)的理事，所以，1981年，他還是回到了芝加哥大學(xué)。

　　福格爾1977年曾任經(jīng)濟(jì)史學(xué)會(huì)會(huì)長，1980年任社會(huì)科學(xué)史學(xué)會(huì)會(huì)長，1978年以后又一直任國立經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局的項(xiàng)目理事。

　　福格爾教授的研究領(lǐng)域是：北美死亡率的經(jīng)濟(jì)解釋，營養(yǎng)、勞動(dòng)福利、勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)力的長期變化，對(duì)美國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長進(jìn)行長期觀察，對(duì)兩代人不同的家庭行為數(shù)據(jù)的分析。通過運(yùn)用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論及數(shù)量的方法來解釋經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和制度變遷，從而刷新了經(jīng)濟(jì)史的研究，因此羅伯特·福格爾以他在計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)史方面出色的工作榮獲了1993年諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)。

　　福格爾的《鐵路和美國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長：計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)史學(xué)論文集》的出版，標(biāo)志著“歷史計(jì)量學(xué)”或“新定量經(jīng)濟(jì)史學(xué)：的誕生。這是把新古典經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的原理同統(tǒng)計(jì)推斷原理相結(jié)合的一門新學(xué)科，用以考察這樣的反事實(shí)性問題：如果鐵路從來就不存在，美國的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率會(huì)是多少？

　　對(duì)那些反對(duì)這一問題的人說來答案是：所有歷史研究實(shí)際上都是提出反事實(shí)性問題，不過是采用含蓄的而不是直率的方式罷了。

　　在圍繞“新經(jīng)濟(jì)”史學(xué)的興起而展開的熱烈討論中，福格爾堅(jiān)定地維護(hù)《美國經(jīng)濟(jì)史新釋》和《“科學(xué)”史學(xué)與傳統(tǒng)史學(xué)》中明確制定的方法。不僅如此，對(duì)于19世紀(jì)美國鐵路的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響，福格爾推翻了不少過去的研究；
與恩哲爾曼齊心協(xié)力，重新考察了美國奴隸制經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)。美國史是以其受到熱烈的爭論而著名的課題，而《苦難的時(shí)代：美國黑奴制經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)》要算是迄今在美國史方面出版的一本爭議最大的書�？道�德（A ·H ·Conrad）和邁耶爾（J ·R ·Meyer ）發(fā)表在《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)雜志》1958年4月、10月號(hào)上的那篇文章《南北戰(zhàn)爭前的南方奴隸制經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)》，最先與那種認(rèn)為奴隸制是一種無效益、不贏利的生產(chǎn)方式的正統(tǒng)觀點(diǎn)唱反調(diào)。福格爾和恩哲爾曼接受了這篇經(jīng)典文章的觀點(diǎn)，進(jìn)而嚴(yán)加抨擊像種族主義者那樣的死死維護(hù)正統(tǒng)觀點(diǎn)的那些人；
堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為奴隸制具有相當(dāng)?shù)男б�，并且唯有像南北�?zhàn)爭那樣的超經(jīng)濟(jì)力量才可能導(dǎo)致它解體。他們的書已多次被譯成別種文字。在不到10年的時(shí)間里，對(duì)這本書的各種評(píng)論文獻(xiàn)就遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過了原書本身。

　　有人認(rèn)為福格爾對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)史的貢獻(xiàn)僅僅是用挑釁性方式解釋過去，這種看法也許是誤解。從歷史的檔案中重新發(fā)掘各種有關(guān)資料，是福格爾大部分工作的中心內(nèi)容。他把美國經(jīng)濟(jì)追溯到18世紀(jì)，重新建立了諸如這樣一些變量的時(shí)間序列：生育率與死亡率、女性參與率、移民率、人口流動(dòng)率以及儲(chǔ)蓄率。

相關(guān)熱詞搜索：羅伯特 有可能 中國 目標(biāo) 增長